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Corporate Social Responsibility Does Not Avert the 
Tragedy of the Commons -- 
Case Study: Coca-Cola India 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
'Tragedy of the commons' is a powerful concept to analyze a variety of problems related 
to environmental sustainability. The commons problem can be solved if individuals 
behave altruistically. In the business context, this article studies the proposition that 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) can avert the tragedy of the commons by examining 
one case study in depth: Coca-Cola's bottling operations in Rajasthan, India. In spite of 
choosing a context favorable to the proposition, the results indicate that CSR does not 
avert the tragedy of the commons. To address the major environmental challenges, it is 
essential to develop regulatory regimes with appropriate incentives and ability to enforce 
sanctions. 
 
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility; tragedy of the commons; common-pool 
resource; environmental sustainability. 
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In one of the most cited scientific articles ever written, Garrett Hardin outlined 'the 
tragedy of the commons,' a powerful metaphor that the users of a commons are caught in 
an inevitable process that leads to the destruction of the very resource on which they 
depend.1 It is now a central concept in human ecology and the study of the environment, 
and can be used to view a variety of commons related problems, such as population 
growth, environmental pollution, groundwater basins, forest management, climate 
change, fishing, wildlife habitats, and traffic congestion. The prediction of the inevitable 
tragedy assumes that all individuals are inherently selfish. The tragedy of the commons, 
of course, can be averted if individuals behave altruistically, and voluntarily act in the 
interests of others in the wider community. Translating this to the business context, the 
tragedy of the commons can be averted if companies have a corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) to go beyond making profits and achieve some positive social goals. 
 
This article studies the proposition that CSR can avert the tragedy of the commons by 
examining a case study in depth. I choose a case study -- Coca-Cola's bottling operations 
in Rajasthan, India -- that is favorable to the proposition. The company Coca-Cola, both 
globally and in India, vociferously proclaims to be socially responsible. Since water is the 
critical input to Coca-Cola's operations, it is not surprising that the company emphasizes 
its water stewardship efforts, especially in the desert location of Rajasthan. In spite of 
choosing a context favorable to the proposition, the results indicate that CSR does not 
avert the tragedy of the commons. 
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Following Hardin's famous article, there is a vast literature on managing the commons. I 
provide a very brief overview of the critical concepts for solving the commons problem, 
and translate these ideas to the business context. There is also a vast literature on CSR, 
and the next section provides a brief overview of this concept, and links together these 
two fields. The rest of the paper describes the case study and draws conclusions about the 
effectiveness of CSR for averting the tragedy of the commons. 
 
The Tragedy of the Commons 
Hardin explained the tragedy of the commons using the fable of a pasture open to all. 
Each herdsman 'rationally' adds more sheep because his expected benefits are greater 
than expected costs, since he selfishly ignores the costs imposed on the others. Thus, 
individual decisions cumulate to tragic overuse and the potential destruction of the 
commons. Subsequent research has argued that it is necessary to distinguish between the 
intrinsic nature of the resource and the property regime under which it is held.2 Common-
pool resources (CPRs) are characterized by 1) difficulty of excluding beneficiaries 
through physical and institutional means, and 2) subtractability, that is use by an 
individual reduces resources available to others. The literature identifies four types of 
property rights: open access (that is, no property rights), individual property, group 
property and government property. 
 
Hardin has been criticized for confounding the intrinsic nature of the resource and the 
regime under which it is held. As Hardin later acknowledged, his argument applies to an 
open access CPR, or an "unregulated commons."3 In the absence of rules for managing 
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the CPR, the fundamental problem is free riding along two dimensions: overuse without 
concern for the adverse effect on others, and a lack of contributions to maintain and 
improve the CPR. Solving CPR problems involves two distinct elements: restricting 
access, and creating incentives for users to invest in the CPR. 
 
Altruism 
A critical assumption underlying Hardin's reasoning is that individuals are inherently 
selfish, "locked into a system that compels" them to pursue their own best interest. It is 
ineffective for society to appeal to an "individual exploiting a commons to restrain 
himself for the general good by means of his conscience." Using Darwinian logic, Hardin 
argued that "such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works towards the 
elimination of the conscience from the race."  
 
The tragedy of the commons, of course, can be averted if individuals voluntarily act in 
the interests of others in the wider community.4 Many scholars have argued that this 
seems to the normal mode of human behavior. Human beings are prone to altruism, or 
concern for others. According to the US Department of Labor, about 65 million people 
volunteered at least once in 2011, at the median rate of 51 hours per year. Most, if not all, 
of the world's religions promote altruism as a very important moral value. A stream of 
research on reciprocal altruism is based on the theory of repeated games, and shows that 
"cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in a predominantly noncooperative 
world, can thrive in a variegated environment, and can defend itself once fully 
established."5 Contemporary discussions of altruism are often based on evolutionary 
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theories such as reciprocal altruism and kin selection.6 Some evolutionary biologists go 
so far as to argue that "morality is grounded in our biology."7  
 
However, the rational actor model that posits strict self-interest dominates the field of 
economics, and is also influential in other fields including political science, sociology, 
ecology, and psychology. As Adam Smith said "we are not ready to suspect any person of 
being defective in selfishness."8 This rational actor model explains why market 
institutions facilitate an efficient allocation of private goods, and is supported by much 
empirical research. It is not surprising that the bulk of research, especially in economics 
and political science, on solving CPR problems eschews altruism and focuses on property 
regimes. 
 
Property Regimes 
When a CPR is left to an open-access regime, that is, there are no enforced property 
rights, it results in degradation and destruction of the resource. In individual property 
regimes, resource rights are held by individuals who can exclude others; an example 
might be private ownership of grazing land bounded by a fence. For most CPRs, 
individual privatization is not a feasible option in practice; as an extreme example, it 
would be impossible to privatize the earth's ozone layer. Accordingly, most research on 
CPR problems does not consider this a viable solution. In group property regimes, 
resource rights are held by a group of users who can exclude others, and manage the CPR 
using various mechanisms such as communication, trust, reciprocity, reputation, 
sanctions, and binding commitments. Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Prize economist, has studied 
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a large number of commons problems in fisheries, grazing, forests, and irrigation 
systems, and shows how groups of users have developed local (as opposed to 
governmental) institutional arrangements to successfully manage CPRs.9 User groups 
characterized by the presence of a community, small and stable populations, a thick 
social network, and social norms promoting conservation do better at establishing 
effective group rights schemes. In government property regimes, resource rights are held 
by a government (central or a lower level) that can regulate the CPR, and enforce 
incentives such as taxes and subsidies. For example, the government in Singapore 
imposes a toll on traffic in the central business district to control congestion. Empirical 
research has demonstrated that no property regime works well for all CPRs, and problems 
continue to exist in all property regimes. Elinor Ostrom has identified design principles 
associated with institutions that have successfully managed CPRs, with a special focus on 
group property regimes.10  
 
The world's fisheries are in serious trouble due to overexploitation. In an open access 
regime, each fisherman has an incentive to 'race to fish' to outcompete the other 
fishermen, leading to eventual collapse of the fishery -- the tragedy of the commons. In a 
widely cited study, Worm et al estimated that about 27% of the world's fisheries were 
collapsed in 2003, and extrapolated the trend to predict that 100% of the world's fisheries 
could be collapsed by 2048.11 The best way to protect the fisheries is to give the 
fishermen well-defined, long-term property rights to a share of the fish. In government 
regulated fisheries, as in Iceland and New Zealand, this has taken the form of a tradable 
share of a fishing quota.12 In other countries, especially developing countries, some 
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fisheries are governed by a group property regime that gives rights over an expanse of 
coastal waters to a cooperative or fishing community, which then gives each licensed 
fisherman a fraction of the catch. Costello et al studied 11,135 commercial fisheries 
around the world between 1950 and 2003, and found that the collapse rate was cut in half 
among the fisheries managed by government or group property regime compared to open 
access fisheries.13 This supports the view that altruism does not effectively help avert the 
tragedy of the commons, whereas group and government property regimes are effective. 
Although the global rate of adoption of rights-based approach has increased since 1970, 
unfortunately the spread of such schemes has been very slow. The study identified only 
121 fisheries (out of 11,135) managed using a share of the catch schemes in 2003. 
 
 
Business Context 
 
Neither Hardin nor most of the subsequent literature on managing CPRs explicitly 
analyze the situation when the users are modern corporations owned by shareholders and 
run by professional mangers. Corporations are even less inclined to act altruistically to 
preserve the CPRs in open access regimes. According to neoliberal economic 
perspective, company managers have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders to 
maximize profits while conforming to the laws and norms of society.14 The modern 
business corporation is "the one important actor in our market economy that does match 
Hardin's depiction of the implacably rational, self-interested economic agent."15 So, it 
would seem that Hardin's dire prediction of the tragedy of the commons applies even 
more in an economic landscape populated by publicly traded companies. 
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The contrary, and more optimistic, view is that companies have a corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and "decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a 
cleaner environment."16 Thus, CSR is the corporate counterpart of altruism at the 
individual level, and will help avert the tragedy of the commons in a business context.17 
There is a vast literature on CSR, and simultaneously much controversy surrounding the 
concept.18 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
For CSR to move beyond empty platitudes, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between 
socially desirable activities that are profitable and those that are unprofitable for the firm 
involved.19 Much of the contemporary literature on CSR emphasizes its positive links to 
profitability.20  The business case for CSR states that as companies behave more 
responsibly, they also become more profitable.  One such recent article in the Harvard 
Business Review states “executives behave as though they have to choose between the 
largely social benefits of developing sustainable products or processes and the financial 
costs of doing so.  But that’s simply not true.”21  Another article in the Harvard Business 
Review proposes “a new way to look at the relationship between business and society 
that does not treat corporate success and social welfare as a zero-sum game.”22  Much of 
the popular business literature exhorting firms to be socially responsible is in this vein 
and assumes, at least implicitly, that all socially desirable behavior is perfectly consistent 
with the firms' self-interest. This, of course, is contrary to the very concept of a CPR, 
which is characterized by a free-rider problem. The essence of a CPR problem is that in 
an open access regime the interests of one user are not congruent with the collective 
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interests of society. Many contemporary societal problems clearly involve a CPR, and 
this view of CSR will not avert the tragedy of the commons. 
 
For CSR to help avert the tragedy of the commons, it is necessary to define CSR as a 
company’s responsibility to voluntarily undertake socially desirable behavior that 
decreases the firm's profits.23 Only then does CSR become the business equivalent of 
altruism at the individual level, and help avert the tragedy of the commons. It is an 
empirical question whether firms in fact do practice (and, not just proclaim) CSR and 
help avert the tragedy of the commons. The case study described below examines this 
proposition in the context of Coca-Cola India’s bottling operations in Rajasthan, India. 
 
The alternative to CSR for averting the tragedy of the commons is a property regime to 
manage the CPR (see Table 1). Due to the very nature of a CPR (especially a large, 
complex CPR), it is rarely feasible to assign property rights to firms individually. 
Moreover, private ownership by large corporations of a CPR, which are often perceived 
as public goods, would be politically difficult in most democratic countries. Most 
examples of successful group property schemes have been in the context of very local 
communities, such as villages in Switzerland and Nepal.24 People live in the same village 
for generations and intend to live there for generations to come. The use of community 
sanctions and social pressure was an important element of the group property regime, as 
were communication, trust, reputation, and anticipation of future interactions. All these 
elements are difficult to establish in the business context, making group property rights a 
less viable solution. Ostrom et al acknowledge that the "humanity now faces new 
 11
challenges to establish global institutions to manage biodiversity, climate change, and 
other ecosystem services," and that these challenges will be particularly difficult because 
of the scale of the problem, cultural diversity, complexity of interlinked CPRs, 
accelerating rates of change, and need for unanimity. Thus, developing group property 
regimes in a business context with modern corporations will be rather difficult. It is not 
surprising that the success record of self-regulation by industries has been mixed at 
best.25 Government property regime is in a sense the ultimate solution, because the 
government has the legitimate power of coercion to enforce the rules. Hardin referred to 
this as "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected." It 
is the role and the responsibility of the government in a democratic society to manage the 
CPRs; a necessary condition for this to succeed, of course, is a competent government. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Case Study: Coca-Cola India 
Social activists have long leveled various accusations against Coca-Cola, such as human 
rights abuses in Columbia, waste-disposal practices in India, and groundwater depletion 
in India.26 This article examines in depth only one issue: groundwater use at one location, 
Kaladera, in the state of Rajasthan in India. According to the Wall Street Journal, 
“numerous NGOs both inside and outside India accuse Coke, among other ‘crimes,’ of 
sucking local Indian communities dry through excessive pumping” of groundwater.27 
There were protests against Coca-Cola in Plachimada, Kerala, starting in 2002, which led 
to the government of Kerala shutting down the Coke plant in 2004. Coca Cola has 
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disputed the court ruling, but the plant remains closed. There were similar protests that 
Coca-Cola bottling plants deplete the groundwater supply in Mehndiganj (Uttar Pradesh) 
and in Kaladera (Rajasthan). India Resources Center, a small NGO, has been a prominent 
critic of Coca-Cola India. Students Organizing for Labor and Economic Equality at the 
University of Michigan picked up on several accusations against Coca-Cola, and in 2004 
formally requested the University of Michigan to cease doing business with Coca-Cola.28 
After a short suspension in 2006, the University resumed doing business with Coca-Cola, 
after the company agreed to the University’s demand for an independent audit, which was 
performed by The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), a prestigious Delhi-based, not-
for-profit, policy research organization. 
 
The TERI report was a particularly useful source for the case study described below.29 
Besides using various previous publications, I visited Delhi and Rajasthan for two weeks 
in 2011, and interviewed several Coca-Cola India executives both at the country 
headquarters in Delhi and the bottling plant in Rajasthan, government officials at both the 
federal and state levels, local farmers and village leaders in Kaladera, and NGOs 
concerned about the water situation in India. All data and statements obtained from Coca-
Cola India executives and used in this article were confirmed by the company in a written 
email, which is available from the author. 
 
The Coca-Cola case was chosen precisely because the company vociferously proclaims 
its social responsibility. Muhtar Kent, Chairman and CEO, states, "We support the United 
Nations Global Compact, and see our sustainability efforts first and foremost as the right 
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thing to do -- the continuation of responsible corporate citizenship that began in our 
earliest days as a company."30 It should be noted that Muhtar Kent does not make a 
‘business case for CSR,’ and instead defines CSR along the lines of this article. Coca-
Cola India's website claims that "The Coca-Cola Company has always placed high value 
on good citizenship. ... Coca-Cola India provides extensive support for community 
programs across the country, with a focus on education, health and water conservation."31 
Several Coca-Cola India executives I met had business cards with some CSR slogan 
printed on the reverse side; here is one example: “Live Positively is our commitment to 
making a positive difference in the world so that sustainability is part of everything we 
do. Forever.” 
 
Given the nature of the company's products, it has appropriately focused its sustainability 
efforts on water resources. Muhtar Kent states, "At The Coca-Cola Company, we are 
transforming the way we think and act about water stewardship. It is in the long-term 
interest of both our business and the communities where we operate to be good stewards 
of our most critical shared resource, water."32 The company claims that water 
stewardship "is now clearly embedded in both our business strategy and our vision for 
sustainable business growth." 
 
Water Crisis 
The world faces a water crisis. According to the United Nations Environmental Program, 
200 scientists in 50 countries identified water shortage as one of the two most worrying 
problems for this millennium (the other was global warming).33 The World Water 
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Council believes that by 2020 we shall need 17% more water than available to feed the 
world. Today, one person in seven in the world does not have access to safe drinking 
water, and one in three lacks safe sanitation.34 Compared to many other countries, India 
faces a more imminent water crisis. "China's 1.33 billion people each have 2,117 cubic 
meters of water available per year, compared with 1,614 cubic meters in India and as 
much as 9,943 cubic meters in the U.S., according to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. The 1.2 billion people in India, where farmers use 80 
percent of available water, will exhaust their freshwater supplies by 2050 at the current 
rate, the World Bank estimates."35 The water crisis is predictably worse in the desert state 
of Rajasthan, where surface water is meager and the entire state is principally dependent 
on subterranean groundwater. Rajasthan has semi-arid to arid climate, and experiences 
frequent droughts (46 times during 1901-2002).36 
 
The village of Kaladera (where the Coca-Cola plant is located), in the Jaipur district of 
Rajasthan, sits atop groundwater aquifers, which support many neighboring towns and 
villages. The Kaladera watershed, comprising an area of 309 square kilometers, was 
officially designated as "overexploited" – that is, the withdrawal rate exceeds the natural 
recharge rate -- by the Central Ground Water Board in 1998. The TERI study in 2006 
independently confirmed that the annual extraction of groundwater is "at least 1.35 times" 
the natural recharge rate; the government statistics indicate the exploitation ratio was 2.47 
in 2004.37 The groundwater level in Kaladera has dropped significantly from about 9 to 
38 meters below ground level in the last twenty years, (see Figure 1). The rate of decline, 
which averaged 0.5 meters per year during 1984-1996, accelerated to 1.4 meters per year 
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during 1996-2006, according to the Sate Groundwater Department; Figure 1 indicates 
further acceleration since 2006. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The decline in the water table has clearly had a negative impact on the people (mostly 
farmers) living in the Kaladera area. The farmers said their livelihood had been affected 
due to increased cost of irrigation: they had to dig deeper wells and purchase more 
powerful pumps. More land was left fallow because of inadequate water supply for 
irrigation. They felt that the crop yield levels had been reduced, although there was no 
hard empirical evidence. The women emphasized that the water crisis had reduced their 
availability of water for drinking and domestic purposes. They had to spend more time 
and effort fetching water, and there were more conflicts between women queuing up at 
the local wells. The women claimed that the yield of milk had gone down because they 
could not provide enough water to their cattle. 
 
Causes of the Water Crisis 
Some of the stakeholders felt that one of the causes of the water crisis was reduced 
rainfall in recent years, but the empirical data do not support this explanation. The area 
has experienced mild to moderate droughts for eight of the past 25 years, but this is not 
abnormal given the even longer term pattern cited earlier.38 The problem is the high 
variance in annual rainfall. The Kaladera area receives long-term average rainfall of 
about 600 mm per year, with a standard deviation of about 175 mm. 
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The real cause of the water crisis has been the increasing extraction of groundwater in the 
Kaladera area, which in turn is due to several factors. Water demand has grown along 
with population growth in the region of about 2.6 per cent per year. Higher household 
incomes and changes in lifestyle increasingly involve water intensive activities. The pace 
of urbanization, about 10-15 percent per decade, has also contributed to the growing 
water demand. Although no quantitative data are available, all stakeholders agreed that 
there has been a significant increase in the number of bore wells both for agricultural and 
industrial purposes. 
 
While there has been a gradual shift towards industrial and service sectors, this is still 
mostly a rural area, and agriculture continues to be the predominant occupation. The 
TERI study estimated that in the Kaladera area, total groundwater extraction is about 50 
million cubic meters per year, and that agriculture accounts for about 91% of total 
groundwater extraction, and domestic and industrial uses for the remaining 9%. The gross 
area under cultivation and cropping intensity both have increased over the past three 
decades. Farmers increasingly utilize electric pumps, more powerful pumps, and deeper 
wells contributing to growing water extraction. Cropping patterns in the region have 
shifted towards cultivation of water-intensive crops like groundnut, mustard, wheat, and 
millet. The problem has been exacerbated by the spread of free or vastly discounted 
electricity for farmers, who often pump out more water than needed. "A favorite boon of 
politicians courting the rural vote, the low rates have encouraged farmers to pump out 
groundwater with abandon."39 Since electricity is unreliable and free, many farmers leave 
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their pumps on all the time, thus wasting water, according to many of my interview 
subjects.  
 
The Coca-Cola plant was established in 1999 in an industrial park operated by the 
Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation (RIICO), a state 
government agency. The Coca-Cola plant operates four bore wells that are 100 meters 
deep. It is not the only water-dependent factory in the park; others include Rajshri pulp, 
Oswal paper, Rajasthan liquors, and MRK pipes. In its early years of operation, the Coca-
Cola plant withdrew about 200,000 cubic meters of groundwater per year, which is about 
0.4% of total groundwater extraction in the Kaladera area.40 In recent years, Coca-Cola 
has reduced its water usage to about 100,000 cubic meters annually, and therefore might 
account for about 0.2% of total water extraction. Even at its current levels, Coca-Cola is 
one of the largest users of groundwater in the Kaladera area, and might be the single 
largest user. It is certainly perceived by the local people as the largest user of water. 
Coca-Cola's water consumption can be decomposed into the volume of beverages 
produced and the water usage ratio (defined as volume of beverages produced divided by 
water consumed). The production volume, of course, is driven by market demand in the 
region; the plant has always operated at about 30% or less of its installed annual capacity. 
The water usage ratio has come down steadily over the last ten years from about 4.0 to 
about 2.0. While Coca-Cola has implemented various measures to improve its water 
efficiency, the largest factor driving down the water usage ratio is the shift from refillable 
glass bottles to plastic (polyethylene terephthalate) bottles, which significantly reduces 
the water needed to wash the bottles. Thus, the Coca-Cola plant has reduced its 
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groundwater extraction by about half in the last several years, but at the expense of 
increasing the problem of non-degradable plastic bottles. 
 
Coca-Cola's negative impact on the groundwater aquifer is compounded by the fact that 
its peak production, and hence its water extraction, occurs in the summer months April-
June, which coincides with the acute water stress period in the region. At the localized 
level, defined as 2 km radius around the plant, the TERI study estimated that the Coca-
Cola plant accounts for less than 2.7 percent of total water extraction 70 percent of the 
time, and less than 0.9 percent for 40 percent of the time. At its worst, in May 2004, the 
Coca-Cola plant alone accounted for about 8% of the total water extraction at the 
localized level. 
 
Unregulated Commons 
The law in India historically has been that access to and use of groundwater is a right of 
the landowner; there are no restrictions at all on who can pump groundwater, how much 
and for what purpose.41 As result of the rapid expansion of groundwater use and the 
depleting supply, the central government has tried since the 1970s to persuade the states 
to adopt groundwater legislation. In general, water law in India is largely based at the 
state level. A few states (such as Kerala) only recently have adopted groundwater acts, 
but Rajasthan is not one of them.  
 
The state government of Rajasthan drafted in 1999 a State Water Policy to manage and 
regulate water resources. In its current version, the policy states that "planning and 
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development of water resources needs to be governed by the state's perspective" to ensure 
"a judicious and equitable, and sound economic" allocation of water resources to different 
sectors: drinking water, irrigation, power generation, and industrial, in that order of 
priorities.42 "Exploitation of groundwater resources should be so regulated as not to 
exceed recharging possibilities, and also to ensure social equity." The policy advocates, 
"water rates shall be so decided that it conveys the scarcity value of water to users and 
foster the motivation for economy in water usage." The state government should prepare 
projects for artificial recharge of groundwater. All these recommendations are obviously 
sensible, but none have been enacted so far. Thus, in Rajasthan all landowners 
(homeowners, farmers, and businesses) legally can extract as much groundwater as they 
like without concern for other users. In response to my question about the lack of an 
appropriate regulatory regime, the chairman of the Central Ground Water Board replied, 
"we are thinking about it."  
 
The Kaladera area was assessed to be "overexploited" by the Central Ground Water 
Board in 1998. The Coca-Cola plant was established in the RIICO industrial park in 1999 
and commenced production in 2000. The plant sunk four bore wells, and had permission 
for a maximum of five wells. It is not clear why RIICO gave this permission. The TERI 
report speculates about the lack of coordination between the Central Ground Water 
Board, the Central Ground Water Agency, the State Ground Water Department, and 
RIICO. When I asked the head of the State Ground Water Department about the role of 
his department in the RIICO permission, he replied that he did not know since it was 
 20
before his time, and he "guessed" that his department had not been involved. Finally in 
2004-05 RIICO refused to permit establishment of water-intensive industry in the area. 
 
Plant Location 
Since Coca-Cola claims to be socially responsible, one might expect that the company 
would not locate a water-intensive plant in a water-stressed area. I asked Coca-Cola India 
executives why the company had located the plant in Kaladera after the government had 
officially declared the area to be water "overexploited." Their response was "consistent 
with our Company requirements, Environmental Due Diligence was conducted before we 
set up operations. ... The plant was setup after obtaining all necessary clearances from the 
relevant departments of the government. We do not share due diligence reports 
externally.  These reports may contain sensitive information of both - business and legal 
nature." The TERI study cites a similar response from the company on this topic. This 
lack of explanation, let alone a socially responsible explanation, reduces the credibility of 
Coca-Cola’s CSR statements. 
 
A plausible argument is that it is unfair to criticize Coca-Cola for its decision in 1999 to 
locate the plant in Kaladera, since that pre-dated the company's current emphasis on 
water stewardship. In 2002, in an effort to move towards more sustainable operations 
management, the company published its first environmental report.43 In 2003, the 
company announced an Environment and Water Resources Department and appointed 
Jeff Seabright as a vice president to head the department. When asked to explain the 
firm's new global water strategy, Jeff Seabright told The Economist in 2005 that, "water 
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is to Coca-Cola as clean energy is to BP," using an unfortunate choice of analogy.44 It is 
possible that awareness and actions about environmental sustainability at the Indian 
subsidiary lagged these initiatives at the global corporate level. The counterargument 
would be that the issue of water scarcity, especially in Rajasthan, was quite obvious even 
in 1999, and a socially responsible company would not have located a water intensive 
plant in that area, and that the current proclamations about water stewardship are just a 
public relations strategy in response to social activism -- so called 'greenwash.' 
 
Even more curious than the state government permitting a Coca-Cola plant in a water-
stressed area is the fact that the state government gave a tax incentive to Coca-Cola. 
Coca-Cola India executives stated that "according to the tax incentive schedule of the 
Government of Rajasthan, Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages [a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the company] was entitled to sales tax incentive of an amount equivalent to the 
investment for setting up the green field plant amounting to Rs. 39 crores [about $9.1 
million, in 1999]." It would have been more logical for the Rajasthan government to 
exclude water-intensive businesses from the general economic development incentives. A 
profit maximizing company would be expected to exploit the government's perverse 
incentive system. The fact that the government scheme set the incentive amount equal to 
the investment in the plant might also explain why Coca-Cola built a plant with so much 
excess capacity. 
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Kaladera Plant 
The TERI report recommended that Coca-Cola evaluate its options for the Kaladera 
plant, "such as: 
 Transport water from the nearest aquifer that may not be stressed (could 
be quite a distance form the existing plant) 
 Store water from low-stress seasons (may not exist!) 
 Relocate the plant to a water-surplus area 
 Shut down this facility." 
In spite of the fact that Coca-Cola chose TERI to be the independent auditor, the 
company has rejected these four alternatives. Instead the company argues that its 
Kaladera plant is completely consistent with is CSR and water stewardship policies. First, 
the company argues that its plant's "water consumption is very limited and has no impact 
or very minimal impact on the local ground water regime." Second, the company claims 
it has built rain water harvesting structures around Kaladera that recharge the 
groundwater aquifers with 15 times the volume of the water extracted by the plant. Both 
these arguments are problematic. 
 
Small User 
The argument that Coca-Cola is a small user of groundwater is conceptually flawed. As 
Hardin explained in his seminal paper, each user of a CPR sees his impact on the 
resource as being small -- that is the nature of a CPR.45 The aggregate impact of all users 
thinking like this is exactly what leads to the tragedy of the commons. Aside from this, 
Coca-Cola's argument about being a small user is also empirically flawed. 
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Coca-Cola India cites a Central Ground Water Board study that the total groundwater 
extraction in 2005 was divided as follows: 95.06% for irrigation, 4.33% for domestic use, 
and only 0.61% for industrial use. These numbers are somewhat more 'favorable' to 
industrial use, and hence to Coca-Cola, than the TERI numbers (9% for domestic and 
industrial use combined). In a letter to the University of Michigan, the company stated 
"Coca-Cola is a relatively small user of water in Kaladera; the plant taps far less than one 
percent of the area's available water."46 At the other extreme, Coca-Cola's external affairs 
manager for Northern India told a reporter that the Kaladera plant accounted for "3 
percent of the area's groundwater."47 I estimated above that the Coca-Cola plant 
accounted for 0.2% to 0.4% of total water extraction. Overall, the Coca-Cola plant 
probably accounts for somewhere between 0.2 to 1.0 percent of the total water extraction 
in the area.48 It is clearly true that agriculture accounts for the bulk of groundwater 
extraction, and this use alone exceeds the natural recharge rate of the Kaladera aquifers.  
 
But that does not mean we should not pay any attention to the other lower usages of 
groundwater. Agriculture supports far more people and livelihoods than does industry in 
the Kaladera area, and it is necessary to ‘normalize’ the water usage by taking that into 
account. The Kaladera watershed in 2001 had a population of over 620,000 people, and 
more than 92,000 farmers. By comparison, the Coca-Cola plant, which is quite 
mechanized, employs about 70 to 250 people, depending on the season, with higher 
employment in the peak summer months. As a rough calculation, assume that domestic 
use accounts for 4% of total water consumption, Coca-Cola employs 150 people at its 
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plant, and agriculture supports 92,000 livelihoods (ignoring the fact many family 
members usually work on the family farm – an assumption generous to Coca-Cola), then 
the plant would be 'entitled' to only 0.15% of total water usage. Thus, the Coca-Cola 
plant is not a low user of groundwater compared to this 'entitlement' calculated on a per 
person basis. Moreover, according to the government policy the priorities for water use 
are: drinking, agriculture, power generation, and industrial, in that order. This would 
further reduce industry’s, and Coca-Cola’s, ‘entitlement’ of water. And within the 
industrial sector, it is unlikely that the Indian society would rate carbonated soft drinks as 
a high priority. 
 
Rain Water Harvesting 
Coca-Cola has built 140 rain water harvesting (RWH) structures (mostly recharge shafts 
dug into the ground) in the Kaladera area, but how much water they recharge into the 
aquifers is contentious. The TERI audit found that, during field visits to randomly 
selected shafts they were "all in a dilapidated state." The company told TERI that 
maintenance of the structures had been included as a CSR target plan for 2007. I visited a 
RWH structure on the roof of a school, and all the pipes were broken making it 
impossible for it to collect any rainwater. I also visited a recharge shaft that was clogged 
up and could not function. However, I was taken to both these structures by India 
Resources Center, an anti-Coca-Cola NGO. The company told me these structures would 
be repaired before the rainy season, and showed me a recharge shaft that was in good 
shape. The company further said, "for most rain water harvesting structures the 
ownership, and hence long term sustenance, lies with the communities where the 
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structures are built." This casts at least some doubt about the long-term functioning of the 
RWH structures. 
 
More important is the issue of how much water the RWH structures recharge into the 
aquifers, even assuming proper maintenance. Coca-Cola does not actually measure the 
water going into the aquifers, contrary to what Jeff Seabright, Vice President 
Environment & Water Resources, promised to the University of Michigan on January 11, 
2008, "as part of our commitment going forward, we will install measuring devices that 
will verify the amount of water recharged."49 When I asked various Coca-Cola India why 
the company did not measure the water recharged, three executives gave three different 
answers: it is technologically infeasible (that is not true), it is too expensive (in that case, 
install the meters on only a few shafts), and the villagers would steal the meters (in that 
case, find a way to lock down the meters) -- none of these seem valid reasons to break the 
company's explicit commitment.50 The company's external affairs manager told a reporter 
a yet different reason: a meter would require sending someone manually to check it after 
each rainfall -- easy to do that in a country with cheap labor, and there are automatic 
meters.51 Instead of actually measuring the recharge, the company uses a mathematical 
model to calculate the "recharge potential" of the RWH structures. When I asked for the 
mathematical model and its assumptions with the intent of getting it examined by a 
hydrogeologist, the company responded, "the calculations shown in the spread sheet are 
an internal document and not meant for external usage." Coca-Cola has retained the 
consulting firm Golder to audit and assess the artificial recharge projects, but refused to 
share that report too. "Their report is part of our company's internal program and meant 
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for internal audiences only." There is thus absolutely no evidence to support the 
company's claim that it recharges 15 times the amount of water it withdraws. If nothing 
else, such lack of transparency is contrary to the spirit of CSR. It is also contrary to Coca-
Cola's acknowledgement in the letter mentioned above, "we are a user of water in a 
highly water-stressed area, and the burden of proof is on us to demonstrate that we can 
reconcile our operations with local community and watershed needs." The company is 
not keeping its own explicit promises.   
 
I interviewed Professor M.S. Rathore, a specialist in water resource management, and 
Director of the Center for Environment & Development Studies, Jaipur, Rajasthan, who 
asserted that there is “no possibility” of Coca-Cola's RWH structures recharging so much 
water. Coca-Cola states that the cost of constructing a recharge shaft is about Rs. 20,000-
22,000, which is equivalent to about $500. Thus the total cost of the 140 shafts would be 
about $70,000. By way of comparison, Coca-Cola India's annual revenues are probably in 
the order of $1.8 billion, and it plans to invest $2 billion in India over the next five 
years.52 If the recharge shafts are so effective, one wonders why not build many more and 
reverse the decline in the water table. 
 
The objective of this study is not to demonize Coca-Cola; nor should the company be 
canonized. The company is behaving like most profit-maximizing firms. It is just 
unrealistic to expect companies to help solve CPR problems through voluntary CSR. 
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Conclusions 
Underground aquifers are a perfect example of a CPR, characterized by difficulty of 
excluding users and subtractability. Privatization of the Kaladera aquifers clearly is not a 
technically feasible option. The Kaladera watershed in 2001 had a population of over 
600,000 living in many villages and towns, more than 92,000 farmers, over 25,000 
irrigation pumps, spread over an area of 309 square kilometers. It is difficult to see how a 
'thick' community would evolve here to develop a group property regime to 'self-regulate' 
the groundwater supply. This CPR problem is compounded by the fact that there are three 
types of users: households, farmers, and factories, with differing interests and culture. In 
any case, a group property regime has not been developed. As the above discussion 
shows, the government has failed in its responsibility to develop regulations to manage 
and sustain the groundwater aquifers.  Lacking a property regime, the only remaining 
alternative to avert the tragedy of the commons is altruism and CSR. There is no evidence 
of the farmers individually behaving in an altruistic manner. Nor is there evidence that 
businesses, including Coca-Cola, have significantly restrained themselves from extracting 
groundwater. It is unfortunate, and not surprising, that the prediction of the tragedy of the 
unregulated commons is coming true for the Kaladera watershed.  
 
The case study discussed above does not support the proposition that CSR will avert the 
tragedy of the unregulated commons. The case of Coca-Cola in Rajasthan is clearly 
favorable to the proposition since the company proclaims its CSR so vehemently. Coca-
Cola is a very profitable and could easily afford to pay for CSR activities. It is a 
consumer facing company with a very powerful brand; a favorable CSR image would 
 28
enhance its reputation with consumers, and conversely the company would be susceptible 
to public pressure from social activists. CSR related to water resources is integral to the 
company's core business, and not some peripheral activity. A groundwater aquifer is a 
very localized resource with well-defined boundaries, making it easier to see the impact 
of one user's actions. If CSR is not effective in this benign context, there is little chance 
of, say, the cement industry significantly reducing air pollution through CSR, where the 
above favorable conditions are not present. 
 
The lessons to be learnt from this case study are much broader than Coca-Cola and 
Kaladera. Unless we regulate the commons, tragedy looms for Kaladera, for Rajasthan, 
for India, and for the world, with regard to water and other CPRs. "As per internationally 
accepted norms, a person needs 2,000 cubic meters of water per year. However, life can 
go on even at 1,000 cubic meters. But in Rajasthan we are already at 650 cubic meters 
mark. ... In few years, the availability will reach the absolute scarcity mark of 500 cubic 
meters. Previous studies have shown that migration begins at this mark," said Ram 
Lubhaya, principal secretary for water resources, state government of Rajasthan.53 
According to the 2012 draft of the National Water Policy, "skewed availability of water 
between different regions and different people in the same regions is iniquitous and has 
the potential of causing social unrest."54 Many of the environmental challenges the world 
faces, from greenhouse gases to wildlife habitats, involve a common-pool resource. 
Asking companies to voluntarily act in the public interest will not be enough to solve 
these problems. It is essential to develop regulatory regimes with appropriate incentives 
and ability to enforce sanctions.
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Table 1. Solving the CPR Problem 
 
Regime Context of individuals Business context 
Open access Altruism. Very few examples of 
success. 
CSR. 
More research needed. 
Private property 
Individual(s) own the CPR 
(e.g. grazing land). 
Necessary condition: 
technologically feasible to 
easily exclude others. 
Firm(s) own the CPR. 
Unlikely to be technically 
feasible. More importantly, 
unlikely to be politically 
feasible. 
Group property 
Many successful examples, 
almost all at level of local 
communities. 
Necessary condition: ‘thick’ 
community capable of 
fostering trust, making 
binding commitments and 
enforcing sanctions. 
Self-regulation. 
Unlikely to be successful 
without enforcement 
mechanisms, particularly 
for large, complex CPR. 
Difficult to develop a 
‘thick’ community among 
firms. 
Government property 
Many successful examples. 
Necessary condition: 
competent government. 
Many successful examples. 
Necessary condition: 
competent government. 
Particularly difficult if the 
CPR cuts across national 
boundaries. 
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